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1. PHILOSOPHY AND LINGUISTICS AND Linguistics and Philosophy
1.1. Apology
A BibTeX-formatted bibliography of the first twenty-five years of
Linguistics and Philosophy, with topic keywords, is available at
www.eecs.umich.edu/∼rthomaso/l-and-p/. Rather than attempting an over-
view of what has been accomplished in the pages of this journal, or even a
proper introduction to the papers in this issue that celebrate its twenty-
fifth anniversary, we instead try to present our own view of why each
of the two subjects is profoundly and enduringly important to the other.
The lack of italics in the title is intentional: we are concerned here more
with Linguistics and Philosophy than with Linguistics and Philosophy, al-
though of course the two are related. Our discussion begins with a general
rationale, which we illustrate with two case studies, dealing with natural
language metaphysics and with some philosophical issues in the semantics
of words. The case studies are meant to provide examples of the sort of
interesting, nontrivial interactions between Linguistics and Philosophy that
create a special need and niche for Linguistics and Philosophy. They illus-
trate the many, and many unexpected, ways that the two fields affect one
another. The role of L&P in fostering this interaction has been enormous
and salutary for both fields.
1.2. The Importance of Linguistics to Philosophy
To begin with, philosophy consists in using common sense intuitions to
attack ill-defined, important, fundamental problems: the basic categories
of existence and change, the nature of human thought and knowledge, and
the ultimate goals of human life. The perennial questions of philosophy
have a foundational bias – they are directly related to intuitions that are
accessible to all of us, they do not use any specialized methods, and they
often have an aporemic or dialectical flavor.
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But such problems can lead to specialized methods and questions, and
as these develop and become more circumscribed, separate, technical dis-
ciplines may emerge. The foundations of these disciplines will typically
repeat, in more refined form, the perennial unsolved questions of philo-
sophy. But the bulk of the “normal science” in which unphilosophical
specialties are engaged uses empirical and theoretical methods that have
developed far from the original, unrefined methods of philosophy.
Although it has always maintained contact with immediate, common
sense methodology, professional philosophy has also developed special-
ized methods of its own. Methods that depend on insights into language
and linguistic usage have been used in philosophy since Plato and Ar-
istotle. But these linguistic techniques became especially important in
Twentieth Century philosophy. Cassirer (1955), Carnap (1956) and Aus-
tin (1956–57) all published at about the same time,1 illustrate three very
different influences of linguistic methods on philosophy. Cassirer, a neo-
Kantian, felt that the best evidence concerning the fundamental categories
of human cognition came from linguistic anthropology. Cassirer’s work
therefore combines the Kantian tradition in philosophy with the methods
of linguists like Wilhelm von Humboldt and Otto Jesperson. Carnap, on
the other hand, represents the tradition in philosophical logic, which com-
bines intuitions concerning language and reasoning with the methods of
symbolic logic that emerged during the late Nineteenth and early Twen-
tieth Century. And Austin represents the “ordinary language” tradition of
preparing the way for philosophical work by carefully and systematically
examining linguistic usage.
Cassirer’s project (which we would now characterize as that of recov-
ering the basic categories of human thought by investigating universals of
human language) was not continued as such in philosophy, though there
has been a later (and more or less independent) revival of similar ideas
in “natural language metaphysics” (Bach 1989). Related themes are pur-
sued in later linguistic work in lexical semantics, and in the philosophical
and linguistic work on events and event typology influenced by Zeno
Vendler and Donald Davidson; see, for instance, Dowty (1979, 1988);
Levin (1993), Parsons (1990) and Steedman (1998). However, unlike Cas-
sirer’s work, the traditions that Carnap and Austin represent were absorbed
into the mainstream tradition in analytical philosophy that continues to
dominate the English-speaking world to this day.
Neither Carnap’s nor Austin’s work relied directly on the results or
methods of linguistics. Although some philosophers were influenced in
1 Cassirer (1955) had appeared in German during the 1920s. The 1955 publication is
the English translation.
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their approach to language by structuralist linguistics and behaviorist psy-
chology, contributions like Morris (1946), when viewed in retrospect, do
not seem as significant as those that were inspired by cognitivist, post-
Chomskian linguistics. Although one suspects that Austin would have
found this linguistic work congenial, and though his regular Saturday
morning groups devoted part of a term to reading Chomsky (1957), this
took place only shortly before Austin’s death,2 and there was no opportun-
ity to see how this influence would have played out in his philosophy. C.
G. New presents a convincing critique of the methods of ordinary language
philosophy as practiced by Austin, concluding with the recommendation
that these methods should be supplemented with “the techniques available
in general linguistics for the handling of the linguistic material to be ex-
plained”,3 but without, however, going into any detail about what these
methods are or how they are to be deployed in philosophy. Much of the
philosophical material published in L&P provides useful case studies of
how the techniques of post-Bloomfieldian linguistics can be used in this
way; we will discuss several instances below.
Carnap’s work, on the other hand, suggests a program of explicating
constructions of natural language that do not belong to the narrowly math-
ematical vocabulary so successfully dealt with by symbolic logic. This
program was in fact pursued incrementally by many subsequent philo-
sophical logicians; Montague’s work, which was heavily influenced by
Carnap’s ideas and methodology, systematizes much of this work, and
makes the relation to English language syntax explicit. From this point on,
the work of semantically minded linguists influenced by Montague and of
philosophical logicians working in Carnap’s tradition overlaps to a very
considerable extent.
The foregoing history places linguistics in a special relationship to
contemporary philosophy. Of course, the foundations of linguistics, like
those of any science, provide material for philosophical reflection. But
the results of linguistics – and especially the results of the branches of
linguistics concerned with semantics – provide direct intuitions of the sort
that have always served as the starting points of philosophical positions,
and often provide them in a refined and relatively novel form. To many
analytic philosophers, linguistics is a resource rather than a subject matter.
This relationship is not unique; for instance, recent ethical theory has
been heavily influenced by ideas from economics, and many areas of
contemporary philosophy are influenced by evolutionary theory. But the
influence of linguistic methods is more direct and pervasive than the
2 See Warnock (1969, p. 15).
3 New (1966, p. 164).
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importation of technical ideas from sciences such as economics or evol-
utionary biology, since the methods of some areas of linguistics seem
to provide premises very like those that have been traditionally used in
approaching large-scale, perennial philosophical problems.
1.3. The Importance of Philosophy to Linguistics
Contemporary linguistics, and especially the parts of it that relate to the
lexicon, sentence structure, and meaning, remains close to its philosophical
foundations; many linguists working in these areas find it difficult to avoid
involvement in problems that are essentially philosophical, especially in
trying to determine the cognitive basis of their work. Most of the cog-
nitive sciences remain close to their philosophical roots, but linguists who
have inherited the essentially introspective methods of generative grammar
find themselves in an unusually philosophical position, since the research
program is unsupported by a well developed experimental methodology.
Thus, the foundations of linguistics, and especially their relation to hu-
man cognition, have preoccupied linguists as much as or even more than
philosophers. From Chomsky (1966) to Chomsky (2000), Noam Chom-
sky’s work has represented an attempt to provide a philosophical account
of the parts of linguistic science that can be grounded in the cognitive
constitutions of individual human beings.
It is hard to find examples of philosophical foundations for a science,
whether these are provided by professional philosophers or by the prac-
titioners of the sciences themselves, that are broadly accepted by either
community. The foundational questions raised by any successful science
are difficult, and it is challenging to provide an account of the scientific
results and practices that does justice to the topic, and that gives the re-
flective working scientist a sense of assurance in stepping back from the
details of research to a larger view of its goals and methodology. The chal-
lenge is even greater in the cognitive sciences, which are closer to their
foundations and in which it is difficult to arrive at a workable separation of
philosophical from scientific problems.
L&P has been less concerned with these foundational issues than
with interactions between philosophy and the areas of linguistics con-
cerned with semantics and pragmatics. These areas have seen many fruitful
importations of ideas from philosophy into linguistic theory. The rich
linguistic literature concerning eventualities and aspectual types was im-
ported from a tradition in philosophy going back to Aristotle; likewise,
so-called “donkey anaphora”4 can be traced to Scholastic logic. Many
4 Including the donkey metaphor itself, which goes back to medieval times; see Ordine
(1996a).
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of the more important recent themes in the theory of discourse, includ-
ing implicature, presupposition, and the theory of focus phenomena, are
realized in a literature that is heavily influenced by linguistic and philo-
sophical ideas, and in which it is often impossible to disentangle the two
components. All of these interactions are amply illustrated in the pages of
L&P.
1.4. The Mission of L&P
The first issue of L&P appeared in 1977, four years after the publication
of Richard Montague’s “Proper Treatment” (Montague 1973a) provided a
new research focus for semantically minded linguists and linguistically
minded philosophical logicians. The editorial statement (Wall 1977) in
that issue points out that the journal will focus on “those areas where lin-
guistic and philosophical studies overlap”, and cites the following specific
examples of such areas.
1. Traditional areas in the philosophy of language such as meaning and
truth, reference, description, entailment, speech acts.
2. Traditional areas of linguistics such as syntax, semantics, and pragmat-
ics (when the studies are aimed at shedding light on the fundamental
nature of language).
3. Systems of logic with strong connections to natural language: modal
logic, tense logic, epistemic logic, intensional logic.
4. Philosophical questions raised by linguistics as a science: linguistic
methodology, the status of linguistic theories, the nature of linguistic
universals.
5. Philosophically interesting questions at the intersection of linguistics
and other disciplines: language acquisition, language and perception,
language as a social convention.
This list of areas was repeated in the inside cover of the first issue.
Over the years this statement has been amended. Some changes have been
significant (such as the addition of some psycholinguistic and computa-
tional topics), but the strong focus on the intersection of linguistics and
philosophy remains. It is not surprising, then, that, over the years, the
articles published in L&P have focused on this interdisciplinary area. But
a healthy journal with such a focus would not have been possible without
the persistence, over several academic generations, of a strong research
group working in the intersection of the two fields. As in 1977, there
remains today a group who identify their research with the intersection
of linguistics and philosophy; L&P has provided a sense of community for
these people, an ongoing exhibit of the best work in the intersection of the
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fields, and – at its twenty-fifth anniversary – it has compiled a valuable
archive of constructive cooperation between philosophers and linguistics.
2. NATURAL LANGUAGE METAPHYSICS: THE CASE OF MASS AND
COUNT NOUNS
Strawson (1959) and Cassirer (1955) took positions on the nature of lan-
guage and thought that were in many ways similar, especially through their
heavy influence by Kant; but they differed on one crucial point – Cassirer
thought that the underlying structure of human thought could and should
be investigated by looking to cross-cultural and anthropological studies of
human cultures. He also favored the study of evolutionary development of
societies, since he thought (departing in this from Kant) that this under-
lying structure evolved and that its different stages could be discerned by
the study of the culture and language of these differing (“more primitive”)
societies. Strawson, on the other hand, had the view that all human thought
was essentially the same, and that one could investigate this essential
nature in 1950s Oxford as well as in other cultures.
As with Kant, the goal in both authors was to “lay bare” the underlying
ways that we think and discourse about the world. Strawson called this
“descriptive metaphysics”:
Metaphysics has been often revisionary, and less often descriptive. Descriptive metaphys-
ics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary
metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure . . . we can distinguish broadly:
Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley are revisionary, Aristotle and Kant descriptive . . . (Strawson
1959, p. xiii)
The details of the “actual structure of our thought about the world” that
Strawson eventually described were to be justified by a psycho-semantic
(conceptual) investigation.
. . . there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history – or none
recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which, in their most
fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialities of the most
refined thinking. They are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking; and are yet the
indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings.
It is with these, their interconnexions, and the structure that they form, that a descriptive
metaphysics will be primarily concerned. (Strawson 1959, p. xiv)
But as Strawson saw it, these conceptual features had linguistic-
semantic ramifications, and therefore to some degree at least we can
determine the “actual structure of our thought” by an investigation into
Language. It is never very clear in the writings of this school of “ordinary
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language philosophy” whether they believe that cross-linguistic studies
will aid in the discovery of this structure.5 But in any case, Strawson
thought that this investigation requires that we dig “beneath the surface
of any natural language”:
. . . when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a
certain level, are apt to assume, and not expose, those general elements of structure which
the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on
the surface of language, but lies submerged. (Strawson 1959, p. xiv)
In Strawson’s own assessment, the crucial point of this type of inquiry
is that it can use a conceptual investigation to justify why our language
works as it does. His own conceptual investigation “establish[ed] the cent-
ral position which material bodies and persons occupy among particulars
in general . . . [I]n our conceptual scheme as it is, particulars of these
two categories are the basic or fundamental particulars, . . . other types
of particulars must be seen as secondary” (p. xv). This discovery in turn
“explain[s] the connexion between the idea of a particular in general and
that of an object of reference or logical subject” (p. xvi), showing that these
conceptual truths have a reflex in Language. Showing that our language
works the way it does because it “mirrors” our conceptual scheme in turn
justifies the “reverse” investigation of Language as a way to discover what
our conceptual scheme is.
Strawson’s own seminal work on language in Individuals was followed
up by numerous writers intent on giving either (a) the “logical under-
pinnings” for some of Strawson’s linguistic characterizations, or (b) the
“metaphysical underpinnings” of these characterizations, or (c) further
connections between these characterizations and other syntactico-semantic
features of language.
We will review the history of one of Strawson’s “key features of lan-
guage”, which has given rise to work in all three of these directions.
This concerns his “sortal predication”, which he contrasted with “feature-
placing predication” and “characterizing predication”, and the correspond-
ing metaphysical distinction between “sortal universals”, “feature-placing
universals” and “characterizing universals”.
A sortal universal is supposed to provide “a principle for distinguishing,
counting, and re-identifying” individuals. The idea is that sortal predicates
5 Austin favored studying the way certain “experts” used ordinary language – for in-
stance, judges and lexicographers. But he never advocated the study of speech acts as
they are manifest in other languages, apparently thinking that they would be the same as
in English. Strawson’s work generated a rebuttal by Mei (1961), based on the contention
that Chinese did not follow English in certain ways that Strawson assumed to be centrally
important. Strawson apparently did not think this was interesting enough to respond to.
514 FRANCIS JEFFRY PELLETIER AND RICHMOND H. THOMASON
correspond to reidentifiable particulars. Strawson feels that such particu-
lars play a central role in our conceptual scheme. Sortal predicates contain,
as part of their meaning, a way of counting and a way of re-identifying
the particulars they denote. (See Gupta (1980) for one formalization of
this idea.) To understand these terms is therefore to know whether “this
particular of sort X is the same as that one”, after it has undergone some
change. It is to know, when confronted with some phenomenal experience,
how to determine the number of particulars of that sort that there are in the
experience.
The preeminance of particulars/individuals is a hallmark of Strawson’s
metaphysics; according to this view there is no such thing as a “bare indi-
vidual”, rather there are only “individuals under a (sortal) description”.
Strawson claims that even proper names presuppose an implicit sortal
predicate.
A characterizing universal, on the other hand, presupposes that the in-
dividuals have already been distinguished; and it adds a further property
to these individuals. While it is possible for a characterizing universal also
to “offer a criterion of counting and grouping individuals”, it only does so
after the individuals have been distinguished by some antecedent means –
such as by a sortal universal.
Roughly, and with reservations, certain common nouns for particulars introduce sortal
universals, while verbs and adjectives applicable to particulars introduce characterizing
universals. (Strawson 1959, p. 170)
Strawson’s final category is the feature-placing universals. These do not
individuate particulars (as the sortal predicates do), nor do they character-
ize already-individuated particulars (as the characterizing predicates do).
Strawson gives examples such as Snow is falling and There is water here,
and says of them
Snow, water, coal and gold, for example, are general kinds of stuff, not properties or
characteristics of particulars; though being made of snow or being made of gold are charac-
teristics of particulars. Nor are the universal terms introduced into these propositions sortal
universals. No one of them of itself provides a principle for distinguishing, enumerating
and re-identifying particulars of a sort. (Strawson 1959, p. 208)
Strawson’s metaphysical ideas led to the development of “sortal lo-
gics”, which attempted to formalize the alleged primacy of sortals. Most
of the theorists who developed these logics saw (as did Strawson him-
self) that sortal predicates naturally co-occurred with quantifiers, forming
quantifier phrases like All people and Some tables. In turn this led to
the development of logics for restricted quantification where the restric-
tions were combinations of quantifiers and sortal predicates. The proposed
“logical form” of sentences like All people desire to learn was [∀x :
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Person(x)]Desire-to-learn(x), which simultaneously displays the sortal
predicate as having a distinguished syntactic position6 and illustrates how a
quantifier “only makes sense” when it is combined with a restrictive noun
to form a syntactic unit.7 This last feature, the representation of natural
language quantified NPs as syntactic units in the representation language,
is followed now by pretty much every theory in the formal linguistic-
semantics literature. It is not accurate to say that this is due to the influence
of these sortal logics on the linguistics literature, for Montague’s writings
provide an independent source. Nonetheless, some important writers (for
example, James McCawley) were in fact influenced by these more strictly
philosophical considerations to adopt restricted quantification in their se-
mantic representations.8 There are various accounts of sortal logics now on
the market,9 but it turns out to be quite difficult to describe a logic which
honors the intuitive notion of sortal predicate, is not merely a syntactic
variation on classical logic (such as ordinary restricted quantification), and
yet is logically coherent.
It is natural for linguists and linguistically-oriented philosophers to
identify Strawson’s sortal predicates with count nouns, his feature-placing
universals with mass nouns, and his characterizing universals with adject-
ives (and, following Strawson’s own lead, with verbal elements).10 Just
as Strawson had seen a special role for sortal predicates in language, so
6 On the assumption that happy is a characterizing predicate and that therefore happy
person is not itself a complex sortal predicate, the representation of All happy people desire
to learn would be
[∀x : Person(x)](Happy(x) → Desire-to-learn(x)).
If (contrary to most Strawsonians) happy person were a complex sortal predicate, then it
would be represented as
[∀x : Happy(x)&Person(x)]Desire-to-learn(x).
7 The thought in many of these writers was that ordinary quantificational logic with its
unrestricted quantifiers was committed to a doctrine of “bare particulars”, where the values
of the variables of quantification were merely “things” that have no qualities of their own
and instead inherit whatever characteristics they have by means of figuring into the truth
conditions of other parts of a sentence. Thus, in the example of the text, we would have
(∀x)(Person(x) → Desire-to-learn(x)), which is to be read “For each x, if x is a person
then x desires to learn”. But in this reading of the symbolic sentence it is seen that the “for
each x” phrase presumes that x has no intrinsic qualities at all – it is a “bare particular”
– but is awaiting the remainder of the sentence to see what types of properties are being
asserted to hold.
8 There are also semantic accounts for “sortal incorrectness” either in or influenced by
the Montague framework, e.g., (Thomason 1972; Waldo 1979; Keenan 1993).
9 Stevenson (1977) and Freund (2000) are two examples.
10 Although there are some clear differences: thing is a count noun, for instance, but not
a sortal predicate.
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too did he see a special role for feature-placing predicates. And this led
to a particular interest being paid to mass nouns, both from the point of
view of metaphysics and from that of a logic capable of characterizing the
special sorts of inferences in which mass terms can participate. Together,
the metaphysical presuppositions and the logical characterizations can be
seen to give rise to a formal semantics for mass terms. Pelletier (1974)
surveyed the then-existing logical treatments of mass terms to show that
some accommodation was needed,11 and Pelletier (1979) collected many
works relating to the background metaphysics of mass terms (as well as
some of the more strictly logical works). Fruitful deployments of this topic
into computational linguistics (Bunt 1985) and formal semantics (Løn-
ning 1987; Higginbotham 1994) followed, and work on the metaphysical
implications of sortal and mass terms continues to appear (Lowe 1989,
Pelletier 1991).
The pathway that started with Strawson’s feature-placing universals,
passing through the various metaphysical and logical issues that they
evoke, and developing into computational accounts and formal semantic
accounts of mass terms also had another rather surprising turn. The sim-
ilarity of mass terms with plural count terms was noted, and this then led
to a unified account of mass terms and plural count terms. This in turn
generated accounts of distributivity and collectivity that can be grafted
onto the account of plurals.12 This provides a striking case history of
beneficial influences between Linguistics and Philosophy, in which each
field provided the other with problems and projects, and which produced
solutions that could not have been envisioned by either field alone.
Although Strawson himself regarded verbal elements as introdu-
cing characterizing universals, other writers noted similarities between
linguistic-semantic features of the verbal system and the nominal system,
especially as regards the count/mass distinction. Mourelatos (1977) related
notions derived from observations of verbals13 to considerations derived
from comparing mass with count nominals (such as divisiveness) to arrive
at an elegant classification. Hoepelman and Rohrer (1980) drew parallels
11 For example, simple arguments like “This puddle is water, water is wet, so this puddle
is wet” could not be validated in classical logical theories; statements like “water is water”
could not be shown to be classical theorems. In fact, the whole underpinning of classical
quantification theory seemed suspect: what could the values of x be in quantified state-
ments like ∀x(Mx → Gx), where M is a mass term? “For each x, if x is water . . .” just
seems to make no sense. There are also logical issues concerning the relationship between
a mass term and the homophonous count term, for instance the relation between being
liquid and being a liquid.
12 See Link (1983, 1998), Gillon (1992), Gil (1995), for example.
13 Notions such as events, achievements, processes, and the like; see Vendler (1957).
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between verbal tense and mass/count, and Bach (1981a) integrated this
work into a more general theory of verbal and nominal types and their
modifiers. Much recent linguistic work on “eventology” derives from these
observations and analyses, and therefore depends, however distantly and
indirectly, on Strawson’s original work.
Metaphysics is the study of “what (sorts of) things there are”. The Kan-
tian view, emphasized by Strawson and Cassirer, is that we should look to
our innate conceptual structure to determine what things we humans are
forced as such to believe. And it is a short step from that inquiry to the
question “What (sorts of) things do people talk as if there are?” To think
that an answer to the latter question will yield an answer to the first ques-
tion invokes a certain view about the nature of the faculty of Language and
the structure of natural languages. If we take Strawson seriously and find
that the sortal vs. feature-placing universal distinction marks a fundamental
cleavage within human conceptual structure, then one will be chagrined
to learn that different languages draw the count/mass distinction differ-
ently. Mei (1961) claimed that all simple nouns in (all of the dialects of)
Chinese were mass, and that to form sortal predicates from them a speaker
is required to employ a classifier phrase, much as English uses “drop of
water”. But then, says Mei, there is no primacy given to individuals that
are introduced by sortal terms: everything ultimately depends on feature-
placing universals. One can make this sort of point, of course, without
referring to languages like Chinese. Even languages as closely related as
English and French differ on various nouns: plate is count in English but la
vasselle is mass in French, and dandruff is mass but les pellicules is count.
Unless one wants to say that the innate conceptual structure of English
speakers differs from that of French speakers, it seems clear that there
can be no important conceptual feature that is univocally marked by the
difference between mass and count terms.14
One might abandon universal relations between language and concep-
tual structure, and instead think of the metaphysics presumed just one
natural language. Such an investigation – say, English language metaphys-
ics – would seek to discover the sorts of things and relations among them
that are needed to exhibit the structure of meanings that English seems to
have. Instances of single-language metaphysics could then support a cross-
14 One might even wonder within one language, such as English, how there could be
anything important to a distinction that put onions, beans, coins, shoes, beliefs, failures,
noodles, and colds on one side while putting garlic, rice, change, footware, knowledge,
success, spaghetti, and flu on the otherside. But we will not press this issue here. This train
of thought would challenge the relation between language and thought, and would force us
to reconsider the centrality of sortals and particulars.
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linguistic investigation of the features shared by all the various natural
language metaphysics.
This single-language investigation is undertaken in Bach (1981,
1986a, b) which describe English metaphysics in detail.15 And Bach
(1995a), written as the introduction to a systematic comparative of quanti-
fication in natural languages, is at pains to lay out the connections between
studies of mass and count terms, studies of the interpretation of tense and
aspect, and interpretation of quantification in the languages of the world.
The central role assumed by the sortal/mass distinction and its analogical
manifestation in the verbal system of English has become a central locus
of investigation in some cross-linguistic studies (see Bach et al. 1995b, c).
Perhaps Strawson’s insistence on the centrality of the sortal/mass dis-
tinction was correct, and the shortcoming was in his belief that the
distinction was identically manifested in all languages because it was a
universal feature of human cognition. Had he followed Cassirer instead,
he might have allowed for the possibility that the distinction could evolve
and transmogrify as Language and languages develop.
3. LEXICAL SEMANTICS
For most of its history, semantics has amounted to the study of the mean-
ings of words. Except for studies of some limited word combinations
– such as those arising from simple predications – even very ambitious
earlier studies of semantics were confined to words. No doubt, the authors
of these theories assumed that to explain the meaning of a phrase is simply
a matter of explaining the meanings of its components.
As late a work as Ogden and Richards (1923) seems to equate meaning
with the meaning of words; “grammar” is discussed in a brief appendix,
which does not seem to raise the general issue of phrasal meaning. And
even Katz and Fodor (1963) proposes a semantic rule that makes a sentence
meaning no more than a sum of its word meanings.
The model-theoretic idea of assigning semantic values to phrases as a
function of the values of their constituents, which was already well estab-
lished in 1963, turns the assimilation of meanings to word meanings on
its head. The general technique is masked by the syntactic simplicity of
first-order-logic, but is evident in higher-order logic, especially in Alonzo
Church’s elegant formulations; see Church (1940). Here, words simply be-
come the basis case of an inductive definition that assigns semantic values
15 Bach has also investigated the metaphysics of other natural languages, especially
Pacific Northwest languages (Bach 1994, 1995).
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to phrases of arbitrary type. On this conception, the task of semantics is
to interpret phrases: words, as semantically indecomposible phrases, are
merely a degenerate special case.
This technique was imported into natural language semantics by
Richard Montague, in papers dating from the late 1960s, all of them re-
published in Montague (1974). This work reinforced the idea that was
already firmly in the minds of generative syntacticians, of the primacy of
phrases for linguistic analysis, and of the crucial importance of explaining
linguistic productivity. By now, it is one of the most generally accepted
ideas across the various linguistic frameworks for doing semantics.
Although, strictly speaking, treating all categories as phrasal puts the
meanings of words on the same footing as the meanings of other phrases
of the same category, this approach has tended to produce a research
paradigm that concentrates on the meanings of syntactic constructions,
with attention paid to the meanings of specific words only when these
meanings can be classified and studied by extending results from math-
ematical logic: natural language generalized quantifiers are one of these
relatively rare cases. In many cases, these logical methods do not provide
any way to distinguish the meanings of words, so different words tend
to be treated as semantic primitives – different, but not different in any
principled or specifiable way, so that the theory will make no distinctions
between, say, talk ′ and sleep ′. In practice, then, this approach exchanges
the virtues and vices of its predecessor: concentrating on the meanings of
constructions, there is difficulty in saying much about the basic units.
That being said, such an exchange does seem to improve our theoretical
position. It was simply a mistake to assume that the meanings of phrases
could be ignored, or that accounting for them would somehow be trivial.
And now, words are explicitly present in contemporary semantic theories,
so it is hardly possible to ignore them entirely. And it is not as if their mean-
ings are in principle inexplicable; it is just that we lack logical methods for
explicating them with the granularity that seems to be required.
Nothing, therefore, prevents us from hoping that an extended program
of research, involving an empirical investigation of general features of
word meaning and the development or importation from other areas of
logical techniques for formalizing these features, would enable genuine
progress in this area, from which a more adequate theoretical account of
word meaning could emerge – an account which loses nothing that was
learned in the meantime about phrasal meaning. One source of encourage-
ment is that it seems to be possible to approach the matter incrementally.
We certainly do not need to produce a complete definition (or componen-
tial analysis) of each word in our vocabulary. We can proceed “top down”,
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adding partial content to words by means of meaning postulates; as the
system of such postulates develops we may acquire much semantic in-
formation about individual words, even if full definitions are rare. Nothing
prevents these postulates from being organized using an inheritance hier-
archy, a technique that helps to provide a manageable organization of the
lexicon in semantics as well as in other areas.
In fact, there are grounds for more than a mere hope. Progress in sev-
eral different areas has produced results that contribute to this project;
the challenge is to combine and further develop what has already been
accomplished. The purpose of this section is to summarize some of this
work and to indicate its relevance to the overall project.
3.1. Derived Words
A good way to begin this project is to remember that – even in morpholo-
gically impoverished languages like English – many words are structured
in a way that bears on their meaning. The semantic constructions that we
discover in this process also could prove to be useful in classifying words
that do not appear to be morphologically complex. This area of study was
mapped out in Dowty (1979), which identifies a number of important,
recurring elements in semantically complex words. Unsurprisingly, these
elements – becoming, causality, agency, and tending toward a culmination
or goal – represent recurring themes in philosophy. This is not surprising;
you would expect the semantic building-blocks of words to be important,
recurrent ingredients of common sense.
Although these concepts have been an important part of philosophy
ever since Aristotle,16 they have little or nothing to do with mathematics.
In fact, one of the main achievements of the scientific work in the 17th
century which replaced the Aristotelian picture of nature was to replace
these common sense concepts with a very different theory, formulated in
terms of a quantitative, continuous mathematics that dispenses with many
of the important elements of the common sense picture of space, time,
and change. The need to base mathematics on a foundation of rigorously
proved theorems reinforced this departure from common sense.
Apparently, the important elements that are needed to formalize word
meaning are connected with recognizable philosophical problems – often,
problems that have a considerable history. And their formalization is prob-
lematic. It shouldn’t be surprising that such concepts not only challenge
16 And their investigation in contemporary semantics owes a great deal to the philosoph-
ers who pointed out the relevance of Aristotle’s ideas to linguistic problems, especially
the problem of accounting for tense and aspect. See Vendler (1957), Kenny (1963) and
Mourelatos (1977), for instance.
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philosophical reflection, but appear to resist formalization – at least, if a
coherent model-theoretic semantics is a requirement, as Dowty assumed.
We will briefly illustrate these points with becoming and causality.
Becoming. Dowty introduces a primitive BECOME in order to formal-
ize the semantic derivation of inchoatives from statives – for instance, the
derivation of darken from dark. The idea is that, where p is function from
temporal intervals and worlds to truth values, BECOME(p)(I )(w) is true at
interval I and world w if and only if there are intervals J and K such that
(1) J overlaps I and I overlaps K and (2) p(J )(w) is false and p(K)(w)
is true. (I overlaps with J if a final subinterval of I has the same endpoints
as an initial subinterval of J .) The idea is that a state comes into being over
an interval in which it is false towards the beginning and true towards the
end.
As formalizations of the difficult concepts involved in change and
agency go, this one succeeds pretty well. It works well in many cases. But
still, there are problems. As it stands, it does not deal with comparative
inchoatives like worsen. Suppose that if an account of these is added, so
that x worsens holds of intervals in which the referent of x is not worse
(relative to some compared object, say j ) towards the beginning, and is
worse (relative to this same j ) towards the end. The problem then arises
that this combines with Dowty’s rule for the progressive to yield the result
that at most given moments the stock market is worsening and improving.
We can state a related problem (one that Dowty noticed and discussed)
in terms of an even more striking example; everyone’s lifetime will be an
interval of becoming dead, according to the definition.
Perhaps these difficulties are due to the loss of information in account-
ing for becoming over a stretch of time in terms of just the endpoints.
But it is hard to identify the exact nature of the problem, since good
intuitions are sparse about the truth conditions even of simple proposi-
tions over intervals. When Bennett and Partee (1982) introduced interval
semantics, they tried to provide criteria to test for the truth-value of a
proposition over an interval, but did not succeed in finding anything very
robust. Despite the theoretical motivations for introducing intervals in at-
tempting to explain the linguistic phenomena, which Bennett–Partee and
Dowty document well, and the usefulness of intervals in cases like This
seat is occupied, where the subinterval property is not satisfied,17 interval
semantics forces us to assign values in many cases where there seems
to be no very good criterion for assigning them, while at the same time
17 That is, This seat is occupied can be true over a stretch of time, even though This seat
is not occupied is true over some subintervals of the larger interval.
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it seems to miss qualitative information that is an important part of our
common-sense appreciation of change.
These early explorations of interval semantics can be seen as an attempt
to meet the challenges of natural language metaphysics by a fairly conser-
vatative and familiar sort of extension of the available logical apparatus.
(It is a common mathematical generalization to extend a theory over a
domain of objects to a theory over the domain of sets of these objects.) In
contrast, the more recent event-based theories have better intuitive connec-
tions to the relevant phenomena; we can account for a darkening change,
for instance, using an event structure in which a state in which darkness is
absent is connected by a process of darkening to a state in which darkness
is present.18
However, this approach creates a methodological gap that has not yet
been successfully bridged. The current event-based semantics are not em-
bedded in semantic “fragments” as general as those of the 1970s; the
interactions between different constructions are not fully worked out, and
the connection to logical theories – and hence, to reasoning – is less clear.
Causality. Causality, the other concept we will briefly examine, is far
more exciting and problematic. But generally speaking, it presents a story
that is similar to that of becoming.
Dowty (1979) was able to draw on attempts in philosophical logic to
formalize the common sense notion of causality. He appeals to the theory
of Lewis (1977), which in turn is based on the logic of conditionals presen-
ted in Lewis’ earlier book (Lewis 1973). But again, there are flaws in the
formalization, which have to be regarded not as simple errors in deploying
the theory but as genuine problems. We mention a few of these.
The first problem has to do with the polymorphism of explicit causal
verbs. For instance, causal make can take gerundive clauses in subject
position, The stone’s hitting the windshield made it crack, or ordinary noun
phrases, The stone made the windshield crack. Like Lewis, Dowty takes the
basic causal construction to be a relation between sentence types. Dowty’s
analysis of a sentence like Mary made John wash the car amounts to
(1) ∃P [CAUSE(∧P(Mary ′), ∧wash ′(John ′, a)]. (Dowty 1979, p. 225)
That is, there is a property such that Mary’s having this property causes
John to wash the car.
The difficulty is that if it happens to be true that anything at all – say
John’s loving to wash the car – made him wash the car, then, because
love ′(John ′, ∧λx wash ′(x, a))
18 See, for instance, Parsons (1990), Steedman (1998) and Higginbotham et al. (2000).
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is logically equivalent to
Mary ′ =Mary ′ & love ′(John ′, ∧λx wash ′(x, a)),
we can derive (1). This trick, which enables you to turn any proposition
p into a property that equivalently applies to John if and only if p, under-
mines Dowty’s strategy for defining the CAUSE that takes nominal subjects
in terms of the sentential subject CAUSE. The setback we have just noticed
could either be just a minor annoyance or a sign of deeper problems in the
whole approach to formalizing natural language causality.
The breadth and depth of recent contributions to causality and causal
reasoning in disciplines including philosophy, statistics, and computer
science provides a wealth of material for the project of introducing a form-
alization of causality into a linguistic theory. This literature is enormous;
Lewis (1973), of course, is a philosophical landmark, but the subsequent
philosophical literature on the topic is varied and extensive.19 Pearl (2000)
uses ideas from the formalization of probabilistic reasoning in Artificial
Intelligence, but is in fact an extended argument for the necessity of in-
troducing explicit reasoning about causality into statistical formalisms.
Pearl’s approach, conceding that causality may not be an ingredient of
basic physical theories or necessary for the reasoning processes of an
unlimited intelligence, but stressing its vital importance for a limited intel-
ligence interested in explaining and predicting in a complex world, fits well
with the Kantian tradition and the goals of natural language metaphysics.
Attempts to formalize causality are also an important theme in other
areas of Artificial Intelligence. This work goes back to the very beginnings
of the field; one seminal paper, (Simon 1952) even predates the beginning
of AI. Besides the work in AI connecting causality to statistical reason-
ing, there is a tradition, beginning with McCarthy and Hayes (1969) and
McCarthy’s earlier work, that seeks to understand the nature of common
sense and common sense reasoning by formalizing it. This work is prob-
ably the most relevant to semantic concerns; some of it is concerned with
general problems of causality and causal reasoning (see Ortiz 1999); some
is concerned with “qualitative physics” or common sense reasoning about
physical devices (see, for instance, Iwasaki and Simon 1986, Weld and de
Kleer 1990); some is concerned with the role of causality in temporal reas-
oning, especially in planning and explanation (see, for instance, Lifschitz
1997).
19 The philosophical literature is voluminous, and we don’t know of any
recent article with a representative bibliography. For some references, see
http://www.eecs.umich.edu/∼rthomaso/bibs. References concerning causality can be
found in the general bibliography by searching for “causality.”
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These things make the study of common sense causality exciting, but do
not make it easy. Even the theories that are well motivated and carefully
worked out differ widely; and some (such as probability-based theories)
would be difficult to integrate with the familiar formalisms used for natural
language semantics.
The application of causality to natural language phenomena is com-
plicated by the fact that lexical semantics makes some aspects of causality
prominent that are not much studied in the general literature on causality.
Many natural language causal constructions also involve immediacy (or
perhaps normalcy); for instance, to say that Maude pounded the nail into
the floor is not only to say that she caused the nail to be in the floor by
pounding on it, but that the pounding caused the nail to go into the floor in
the usual way. (The pounding couldn’t, or couldn’t normally, be a signal
for someone else to pound the nail in.) Also, this causality seems to be
contingent in many cases; for instance, to say that Stephen broke the goblet
is not to say that what Stephen did to break the goblet must have broken
it. He can’t claim that he didn’t break it by pointing out that he could have
dropped it in the same way without its having broken. This consideration
alone, if it is right, rules out most of the philosophical theories of causality.
Another vexed issue, which has been thoroughly canvassed in the liter-
ature subsequent to Dowty (1979), is the residual form of the “imperfective
paradox”; exactly what is the relation between a true progressive sentence
involving a telic verb, and the successful culmination of the corresponding
process? Dowty’s idea of an “inertial world” is very natural, and has the
advantage of using standard ideas from possible worlds semantics. But the
many objections to it are disturbing.
Eventuality semantics provides possible solutions to some of these
problems. For instance, we may well be able to define causal construc-
tions taking nominal subjects in terms of the AGENT role on events. We
may even be able to dispense with causality, by using the relation between
the initiating event that is part of a complex telic eventuality and the cul-
minating state of that eventuality (when such a state exists) in place of
it.20
However, as before, there is a tradeoff. If we are to use eventuality
semantics for purposes like this, we need to find ways to integrate even-
tualities into explicit semantic theories with linguistic coverage and rigor
that is comparable to the classical formalisms that are based on possible
worlds and higher-order logic alone.
20 See Steedman (1998) for background on complex eventualities. (The idea of using
these eventualities in place of a causal primitive is not mentioned there, but is explored in
Thomason (1999)).
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3.2. The Semantic Classification of Words
Reflection on linguistic meaning is challenged by the elusive nature of its
relationship to linguistic form. A careful reading of Jespersen (1965) gives
a forceful impression of the complexity of this relation; this impression is
reinforced by the many examples put forward by Chomsky, from Chomsky
(1975) to Chomsky (2000). Many philosophical projects during the last
century seem in retrospect to have been misled in their conception by an
overoptimistic conception of the simplicity of the relation between form
and meaning. The idea that speech acts could provide an intermediary that
would somehow close the gap between the sentence uttered and its mean-
ing provides one such example; Grice’s idea that the “logical” expressions
of English in fact have the literal meanings suggested by logical theories
could be another.
Such failures could induce wholesale skepticism concerning the viabil-
ity of natural language semantics.21 But the possibility remains that this
sense of failure may arise in the tendency of some philosophical pro-
grams to be overoptimistic and insufficiently empirical in approaching
these problems, leading to oversimplified hypotheses, whereas the lin-
guistic programs deriving from Montague’s work are limited by what can
be accomplished within the framework of Intensional Logic.
It is not impossible to find hypotheses concerning the relation of form
and meaning that hold up much better under careful examination, and
that also provide important insights into natural language metaphysics.
Levin (1993) makes a very convincing case, based on extensive empirical
evidence from many languages, that there are systematic correspondences
between the patterns of argument structure that are associated with verbs
and the semantic classification of the verb. The semantic categories that
emerge from this investigation (for instance, change of state, changes that
involve physical contact, changes involving locomotion) enlarge the se-
mantic primitives discussed in Dowty (1979), and are clearly important
ingredients in common sense reasoning about space, action, and change.
The formalization of such concepts seems to require the development
of new logics. To a limited extent, there have been attempts in the linguistic
literature to formalize some of the relevant ideas; for instance, see Dowty
(1988, 1991). But cooperative efforts seem to offer the most promising
avenue for progress in this area. Independently, researchers in Artificial In-
telligence, and some philosophers, have been exploring issues that are very
relevant to Levin’s semantic categories; for work that deals with spatial
21 It is not difficult to find examples of this sort of skepticism; see, for instance, Schiffer
(1987) and Chomsky (2000).
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representation and reasoning as well as dynamic issues, see Davis (1991),
Stock (1997), Casati and Varzi (1999).
With this wealth of material to draw on, this seems to be one of the
most exciting times for research in the intersection of linguistics and philo-
sophy. We can surely took forward with anticipation to the next twenty-five
additional years of L&P.
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